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SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY IN A POST-STONERIDGE
WORLD: YES, A SUCCESSFUL SUIT AGAINST SECONDARY
ACTORS IS STILL POSSIBLE
∗

Charles J. Wilkes

I.

INTRODUCTION

The corporate scandals of the past decade have forced plaintiffs,
courts, and scholars alike to grapple with the scope of secondary1
actor liability in securities fraud cases. When does liability under our
nation’s securities laws extend to lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers who draft the documents, develop the procedures, and
structure the transactions that facilitate acts of securities fraud by major corporations? Does liability extend to such actors at all? In response to lingering questions, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted a writ of certiorari to hear Stoneridge Investment Partners,
2
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (“Stoneridge”). Widely viewed as the
most important securities case of recent memory, many hoped Stoneridge would resolve the uncertainty surrounding secondary-actor lia3
bility.
In Stoneridge, the Court found that a vendor who had enabled
one of its customers to defraud its investors could not be held liable
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
∗
J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, The Catholic University of America. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Kristin N.
Johnson, for her invaluable guidance and suggestions. My sincere gratitude also extends to my wonderful parents, Barry and Kim Wilkes, for their support during my
law school career and to my friends, especially Chris Khatami, Brienne Henderson,
and Dave Kurtz, for their friendship and selfless assistance during the past year.
1
For the purposes of this Comment, primary actors include the issuers of securities, and secondary actors generally include those who provide services to primary
actors, such as lawyers, accountants, investment bankers and other vendors. See Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994). “The use of the term ‘secondary actor’ relates only to the party’s role in the
transaction, not secondary or imputed liability.” Rodney D. Chrisman, Stoneridge v.
Scientific-Atlanta: Do Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Require a Misstatement or Omission?, 26
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 839, 896 (2008).
2
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
3
See Chrisman, supra note 1, at 839–40 (discussing the views of several commentators after the Supreme Court granted certiorari).
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4

Act”). The most important question raised by the case was whether a
secondary actor must make a material, public misstatement to be
found liable in a private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b5
5. More specifically, the Court focused on whether a material, public
6
misstatement is a prerequisite to finding that an investor relied on a
secondary actor’s deceptive acts in cases where the secondary actor
7
does not owe a duty of disclosure to the investor. The Court posited
that such a public misstatement is not required for a plaintiff to attach liability but concluded that the defendants’ actions were still
“too remote” from the investors’ losses for the plaintiffs to demon8
strate reliance. But it is unclear when the causal connection between
an investor’s losses and a secondary actor’s deceptive acts would be
sufficient to allow a court to impute reliance and attach liability to the
9
secondary actor.
4

Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and authorized it to
promulgate rules governing several issues related to securities transactions on secondary markets, including securities fraud, insider trading, shareholder voting via
proxy solicitations, tender offers, and periodic disclosures by publicly held corporations. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
CORPORATIONS 404–05 (William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge
eds., 7th ed. 2009). Section 10(b), in particular, authorizes the SEC to promulgate
rules prohibiting fraudulent activities with respect to the purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); see discussion infra Part II.A.
5
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. With respect to the sale or purchase of securities, Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, broadly prohibits engaging in deceptive and manipulative activities,
making untrue statements of material fact, and omitting material facts that would
render statements made not misleading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); see discussion
infra Part II.A.
6
Reliance is a key requirement of securities-fraud actions under Rule 10b-5,
providing the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s violation of the rule
and a plaintiff’s losses. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). Due to the
reality that most securities transactions do not take place in face-to-face encounters,
securities law dispenses with the requirement of positive poof of reliance on a defendant’s deception. Id. at 243–44. The semi-strong form of the efficient-capitalmarkets hypothesis posits that the market price of a security reflects all publicly available information. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (9th ed. 2008). Therefore, because investors
rely on the integrity of a security’s market price, reliance is presumed when misstatements are made in an impersonal and well-developed marketplace. Basic, 485
U.S. at 247.
7
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 761, 769
(2008).
8
Id. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247, for a discussion about proving reliance in a welldeveloped securities market where the fraud-on-the-market presumption is applicable.
9
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770; The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases,
122 HARV. L. REV. 485, 490–92 (2008).
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By not providing a clear framework for determining the existence of such a causal connection, Stoneridge has left an unsettled
landscape for shareholders wishing to pursue actions against second10
ary actors. As one commentator noted, Justice Kennedy and the majority were more concerned with whether their ruling would expand
the scope of liability under § 10(b) than about proposing a workable
11
standard for the reliance requirement. Consequently, Stoneridge neither closed the door on liability for secondary actors nor established
when a secondary actor can be found liable for committing deceptive
acts within the ambit of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This result, of
course, is confusing and discouraging for injured shareholders who
12
want to seek restitution against secondary actors for their losses.
To resolve the open questions that remain, this Comment proposes a new standard pursuant to which a plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of reliance when a secondary actor undertakes intentional
actions aimed at causing the issuance of a misleading statement. Part
II of this Comment discusses the evolution of the scope of liability
under § 10(b) from the passing of the Exchange Act through the Supreme Court’s Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
13
Denver, N.A. (“Central Bank”) decision in 1994. Part III discusses the
post-Central Bank circuit split over the scope of secondary-actor liability. Part IV analyzes the Stoneridge decision in detail and argues that
the scope of liability for secondary actors remains undefined because
the Court did not establish a framework for presuming reliance in
secondary actor cases. Part V explains why existing tests for imputing
reliance and attaching liability to secondary actors are unworkable in
light of Stoneridge. Part VI proposes a test for imputing reliance in the
secondary-actor context. Part VII evaluates arguments for judicial
recognition of the proposed test. Finally, Part VIII evaluates arguments against the proposed test.

10

The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 9, at 492.
Chrisman, supra note 1, at 878.
12
Seth S. Gomm, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Stoneridge Investment
Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and the Supreme Court’s Attempt to Determine
the Issue of Scheme Liability, 61 ARK. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (2009).
13
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
11
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD
FROM THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
THROUGH CENTRAL BANK
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The intensely speculative and highly leveraged securities trading
of the 1920s and the stock market crash of 1929 prompted calls for
increased regulation of the securities markets and more rigorous pro14
tections for investors. As part of a comprehensive effort to establish
15
a regulatory scheme for the banking and securities industries, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Exchange Act of 1934 into law.
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act affords individual investors broad
rights and protections:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
16
for the protection of investors.

Pursuant to § 10(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) to
make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi17
ty.

The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 do not offer an enumerated
list of violations. Thus, it appears that Congress left to the courts the
18
role of establishing parameters for the scope of liability. The committee reports of the House and Senate shed little light on who
14

H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 18, at 2–5 (J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, eds., 1973).
15
Id.
16
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
17
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
18
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 (1976) (“The legislative reports
do not address the scope of § 10(b) or its catchall function directly.”).
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should be liable for violations of Rule 10b-5, except to say that liabili19
ty would not attach without proof of scienter. With reference to §
10(b), the Senate Report merely stated that “‘[i]n addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear statutory provisions
reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative
and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no
20
useful function.’” The Court has concluded that “[t]he [Senate]
Report therefore reveals with respect to the specified practices, an
overall congressional intent to prevent ‘manipulative and deceptive
practices which . . . fulfill no useful function’ and to create private actions for damages stemming from ‘illicit practices,’ where the defen21
dant has not acted in good faith.” The Court further noted that its
conclusions about the Senate Report were consistent with the House
22
Report on the Exchange Act. Presumably, Congress did not contemplate the issues of secondary and primary liability with which the
courts must grapple today.
In the decades following the Great Depression, however, the
courts would begin to define the extent to which private investors
could hold violators of Rule 10b-5 accountable. The Supreme Court
held in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Banker’s Life & Casual23
ty Co. that Manhattan Casualty Company could hold its controlling
shareholder and his collaborators liable under Rule 10b-5 for executing a scheme to purchase the corporation using the corporation’s
24
own money. The Court thereby recognized an implied private right
25
of action against violators of Rule 10b-5. The Court stated that “the
fact that the fraud was perpetrated by an officer of Manhattan and his
outside collaborators is irrelevant to our problem” and citied § 10(b),
which states that “any person” can be held liable for engaging in de26
ceptive acts in connection with the sale of a security.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 204–05 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 6 (1934)).
Id. at 206 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 10–11, 20–21 (1934)).
Id.
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 13 n.9.
Id. at 10.
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B. A Broad Scope of Liability Emerges in the Courts: Liability for Those
Who Merely Aid and Abet Violations of Rule 10b-5
Courts broadly interpreted the implied private right of action to
include suits against those who aid and abet violations of Rule 10b-5.
27
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., the plaintiffs sued
defendant Midwestern for aiding and abetting their stockbroker, Do28
bich Securities, in its fraudulent activities. Dobich failed to deliver
to plaintiffs their stock in Midwestern and used their stock purchase
29
money as working capital for speculation. Plaintiffs who inquired
about the status of their stock certificates with Midwestern received
letters from Midwestern advising them to notify Dobich Securities of
their concerns before reporting the missing stock certificates to the
30
Indiana Securities Commission. Midwestern did this even though it
31
was aware of Dobich’s violations of securities laws. Effectively, this
letter ensured that there would be a delay in notifying the Indiana
32
Securities Commission of Dobich’s actions. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana held that Midwestern could be
33
found liable under § 10(b) as an aider and abettor. The court reasoned that even though congressional amendments to codify aiderand-abettor liability under § 10(b) had never become law, aider-andabettor liability could still be found by applying tort principals to the
34
broad and remedial purpose of the Exchange Act. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and found aider35
and-abettor liability cognizable under § 10(b).
The line of cases establishing a broad scope of liability under §
36
10(b) gave rise to a three-prong test for aider-and-abettor liability.
The first prong of the aider-and-abettor liability test required a plaintiff to show a securities violation by the primary party (the issuer of
27

259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (Brennan I), overruled by Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
28
Id. at 675.
29
Id.
30
Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 152–53 (7th Cir. 1969)
(Brennan II), overruled by Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164.
31
Id. at 151.
32
Id.
33
Brennan I, 259 F. Supp. at 676–81.
34
Id.
35
Brennan II, 417 F.2d at 154 (“It is our view that the district court was correct in
concluding that Midwestern’s acquiescence through silence in the fraudulent conduct of Dobich combined with its affirmative acts was a form of aiding and abetting
cognizable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
36
See IIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980).
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37

the securities). The second prong required a plaintiff to show that
the aider and abettor had knowledge of the securities violation of the
primary violator; this satisfied the scienter requirement of securities
38
fraud. The third prong required a plaintiff to show that the aider
and abettor contributed substantial assistance to the achievement of
39
the violation. This test for aiding and abetting liability reveals that
in the decades following the passage of the Exchange Act, the courts
broadly defined the scope of liability under § 10(b) to include liability for aiding and abetting primary violators of Rule 10b-5. A broad
scope of liability, however, would not remain in force for long.
C. Narrowing the Scope of Liability Under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank presented a paradigm shift in the judiciary’s approach to defining the scope of liability
under § 10(b) by eliminating aider-and-abettor liability and narrow40
ing the scope of liability for secondary actors. Central Bank concerned the sale of bonds by the Colorado Springs Stetson Hills Public
Building Authority for which Central Bank served as an indenture
41
trustee. Under the terms of the indenture agreement, the bonds
had to be secured by landowner assessment liens, and the land subject to the liens had to be worth 160% of the bonds’ outstanding

37

Id.
Id. at 922–23. The Second Circuit held that recklessness satisfied the scienter
requirement where the aider and abettor owed a fiduciary duty to the defrauded party. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978). Where
the aider and abettor owed no fiduciary duty to the defrauded party, however, the
Second Circuit held that the scienter requirement was more stringent and the assistance rendered had to be both substantial and knowing. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells
Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979).
39
IIT, 619 F.2d at 922. With respect to this third prong, certain courts refused to
impose liability when the substantial assistance consisted of inaction except where a
duty to disclose existed. Id. at 925–26; Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir.
1971). Other courts took the view that inaction alone could constitute substantial
assistance even without an independent duty to disclose, provided that there was a
conscious intention to forward the violation. IIT, 619 F.2d at 927; Edwards & Hanly,
602 F.2d at 484–85; Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1975).
40
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 191 (1994).
41
Id. at 167. An indenture trustee is a “third party administrator” of a debt contract. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 19.1, at 668–69 (6th
ed. 2009). The trustee is usually a bank that acts as the agent of the public bond
holders. Id.
38
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42

principal and interest.
After receiving an appraisal in 1988 that
stated that land values had gone almost unchanged from 1986 to
1988, the senior underwriter for the bonds expressed concern to
Central Bank that the bank was using an outdated appraisal and that
the 160% test was not being met because property values were declin43
ing in the Colorado Springs area. Central Bank’s in-house appraiser
concluded that the 1988 appraisal was too optimistic and that an in44
dependent appraiser should be hired to examine the appraisal.
Central Bank decided to delay the outside review of the appraisal un45
til the end of the year. Before the outside appraisal was completed,
46
however, the building authority defaulted on the bonds.
After the default on the bonds, First Interstate Bank of Denver
and Jack K. Naber sued the bonding authority, the underwriters, and
Central Bank, among others, for violations of Rule 10b-5, alleging
that Central Bank was secondarily liable for misrepresentation of the
47
value of the bond collateral. The U.S. District Court for the District
48
of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of Central Bank.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reciting the requirements for a Rule 10b49
5 aiding-and-abetting claim. The Tenth Circuit found that Central
Bank could be held liable as an aider and abettor on the basis of the
50
facts presented. Specifically, the court opined that “a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that Central Bank had rendered substantial assistance by delaying the independent review of the appraisal”
and that there was at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Central Bank was reckless as to a primary violation of Rule
51
10b-5.

42

Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
Id.
44
Id. at 167–68.
45
Id. at 168.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.
49
Id. (citing First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898–903
(10th Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)). The Tenth Circuit set forth the following requirements for an aiding and abetting claim: “(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2)
recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and
(3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.” Id.
50
Id. at 168–69.
51
Id. at 169.
43
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In what has proven to be a watershed decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and, basing its decision on several
grounds, eliminated the implied private right of action against aiders
53
and abettors. First, the Court held that § 10(b) does not include an
express private right of action against aiders and abettors and that
Congress had failed to make aiding and abetting grounds for liability
54
in amendments to the Exchange Act. The Court also noted that
while bills adding aider-and-abettor liability were introduced in Con55
gress in 1957, 1959, and 1960, all of these bills failed. Second, the
Court found that aider-and-abettor liability was untenable because a
critical element for recovery was missing from the aider-and-abettor
56
liability framework: reliance. The Court concluded that aider-andabettor liability allowed plaintiffs to hold defendants liable for aiding
and abetting without showing that they relied on the defendant’s ac57
tions in making their investment decisions. Third, the Court posited that imposing aider-and-abettor liability meant attaching liability
58
to parties who do not commit violations of Rule 10b-5. While §
10(b) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person directly or in59
directly” to commit fraud, the Court’s principal objection to aiderand-abettor liability was that it “reaches persons who do not engage in
the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those
60
who do.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, thus reasoned
that because liability extends only to those who commit deliberately
manipulative or deceptive actions and not to the negligent conduct
of the type identified in this case, aiders and abettors, like Central
61
Bank, should not be held liable.
But to read Central Bank as closing the door on secondary liabili62
ty altogether would be a mistake. While mere aiding and abetting
cannot be the basis for liability in a private right of action, this “does
52
See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) and
the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U.
L. REV. 667, 667 (2004) (discussing how Central Bank constituted a “major upheaval
in securities law”).
53
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
54
Id. at 186.
55
Id. at 186–87.
56
Id. at 180.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 176.
59
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
60
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176.
61
Id. at 177.
62
Id. at 191.
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not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always
63
free from liability under the securities Acts.” In fact, “[a]ny person
or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission)
on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies” can be held liable
as if he were a primary violator under Rule 10b-5, provided that he
64
satisfies all of the elements of primary liability. The Court said that
it could not hold Central Bank liable because it “did not commit a
65
manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of § 10(b).” Thus,
if Central Bank, as a secondary actor, had committed a deceptive or
manipulative act, it could have been held liable under the statute if it
had met the requirements of a primary violation of Rule 10b-5.
Courts should apply the same logic to other secondary actors as well:
a violation of Rule 10b-5 by a secondary actor should be grounds for
liability in a private cause of action provided that the secondary actor
66
satisfies all of the necessary elements of a securities fraud claim.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY POST-CENTRAL
BANK: A BRIGHT-LINE RULE VS. SCHEME LIABILITY
In the years following the Central Bank decision, courts, grappling with the issue of attaching liability to secondary actors in private
causes of action, developed divergent approaches to dealing with very
67
similar instances of deceptive conduct by secondary actors. Some
courts opted for a substantial-participation test, which attaches liability to secondary actors who are substantially involved in the produc68
tion of misstatements made by primary violators of Rule 10b-5. Out
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
The basic elements of a securities fraud claim are:
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission);
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind;
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction causation”;
(5) economic loss; and
(6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (citations omitted).
67
See Eric Berry, Note, Stoneridge and the Short-Lived Experiment of Scheme Liability,
4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 355, 363 (2007) (“The boundary between primary and secondary
violators remain[ed] a matter of dispute between different circuits.”).
68
Chrisman, supra note 1, at 860; see also, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228
F.3d 1057, 1061–63 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that substantial involvement in the
preparation of fraudulent statements is grounds for liability and that signing consti64
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of the substantial-participation test grew the concept of scheme liability articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner
69
Inc. Under this test, a secondary actor is held liable for purposefully
committing deceptive acts, such as drafting misleading SEC filings, as
70
part of a scheme to defraud investors. Other courts opted for a
more stringent, bright-line rule, which requires plaintiffs to attribute
a particular public, material misrepresentation to the secondary actor
before attaching liability to that secondary actor under § 10(b) (i.e.,
the public statement must identify the secondary actor for liability to
71
attach). At the same time, the SEC offered the creator standard as a
compromise between the bright-line rule, on the one hand, and the
substantial participation and scheme liability approaches on the oth72
er. Under the creator standard, a secondary actor is liable if he can
be characterized as an author of the misleading statement, as op73
posed to a mere participant in its drafting. Judicial acceptance of
the creator standard, however, appears to be limited compared to the
74
judicial acceptance of the other tests for secondary-actor liability.
tutes substantial involvement); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d
319, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that where the secondary actor’s participation in
the preparation of a misstatement is substantial enough, the secondary actor will be
treated as having made the statement, and the investors may be deemed to have relied on the misstatement even though the statement is not publicly attributed to the
secondary actor); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that any participant in a course of business or scheme involving the preparation of misstatements can be held liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
69
452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008).
70
For a detailed discussion of the origins and growth of the scheme liability concept, see Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Note, Scheme Liability: Rule 10b-5(a) and Secondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REV. LITIG. 183, 205–34 (2008).
71
See, e.g., Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 476 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2007)
(declining to adopt the substantial-participation test and holding that the misstatement must be publicly attributed to the actor for liability to attach); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that secondary actors’ participation in transactions, regardless of their purpose or effect, does not give rise to liability absent a public misstatement by the secondary actor); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the misstatement must be attributable to the secondary actor for liability to attach); Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the misstatement must be attributable to the secondary actor at the time of
dissemination for liability to attach).
72
Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney Liability Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the
Supreme Court’s Decisions in Tellabs and Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 22
(2008) (“The SEC’s creator standard attempted to forge a compromise between the
bright line standard’s limited attribution rule and the specter of unlimited liability
arguably inherent in the application of the substantial participation standard.”).
73
Id. at 23–24.
74
The Third Circuit in Klein v. Boyd, No. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 WL 55245 (3d
Cir. 1998), adopted the SEC’s creator standard, but its decision was later vacated by
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s scheme-liability concept, the substantialparticipation test, and the bright-line rule dominated pre-Stoneridge
jurisprudence.
A. Scheme Liability: Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.
Under the scheme-liability framework enunciated in Simpson,
secondary actors who engage in deceptive acts can be liable if they
participate in a scheme to defraud investors, which results in misre75
presentations being made to investors. Simpson, like so many other
76
cases, involved fraudulent transactions designed to inflate revenues.
Defendant Homestore.com would identify a third-party corporation
that was thinly capitalized and in need of revenues to facilitate an ini77
tial public offering of its stock. Homestore.com would then agree to
purchase either shares in that company for inflated values or services
78
or products that Homestore.com did not need. The third party
would then agree to purchase advertising from AOL for nearly the
79
entire amount Homestore.com was paying it.
The money thus
flowed from the third party to AOL, which took a commission and
80
then shared the sham advertising revenues with Homestore.com.
The Ninth Circuit considered the question of whether the secondary-actor defendants had committed a primary violation by facilitating Homestore.com’s fraud, but it ultimately decided that they had
81
not. In considering this question, however, the court outlined a
82
framework for finding secondary actors liable as primary actors.
The court first reviewed the basic elements of a securities fraud claim
83
found in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo. The court then proceeded to outline the requirements for scheme liability within the
the court’s decision to grant an en banc rehearing. Schanbaum, supra note 70, at
202–03. Nonetheless, the test would later be adopted in a Northern District of Georgia decision in Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324,
1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998), and by the Southern District of Texas in In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 590–91 (S.D. Tex. 2002). Id. at 203–
04.
75
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008).
76
Id.
77
Id. (quoting In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023
(C.D. Cal. 2003)).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1044.
81
Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046.
82
Id. at 1046–50.
83
544 U.S. 336 (2005); see supra note 66.
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84

purview of § 10(b).
Two of these requirements are particularly
germane to the argument: secondary actors must engage in conduct
with the principal purpose and effect of creating a material misrepresentation as to the value of securities, and the investor must demonstrate reliance on the secondary actor’s acts.
The first requirement for scheme liability is that “the defendant
must have engaged in conduct that had the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of the
85
scheme.” The court distinguished the “principal purpose” prong of
86
scheme liability from the requirement of scienter. Scienter requires
strong “evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct”; it
87
goes to the defendant’s state of mind.
On the other hand, the
“principal purpose and effect test” looks to the nature of the defendant’s conduct and asks whether it was sufficiently deceptive for lia88
bility.
In particular, the court looks to whether the defendant’s
conduct involved an illegitimate transaction that may form the basis
89
of a primary violation of Rule 10b-5. In this case, the court held that
AOL Time Warner and the other defendants ultimately could not be
held liable because their conduct was not sufficiently deceptive within
the meaning of the Exchange Act, as the dealings in which they had
90
engaged were, on their face, legitimate business transactions.
The second requirement for scheme liability is that the plaintiffinvestor must show reliance on the deceptive act of the secondary
91
party. Where the defendant has no duty to disclose information to
investors, courts will presume reliance on a defendant’s misstatements if the misstatements are disseminated into an “efficient mar92
ket.”
The fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance “‘applies to all
three clauses of Rule 10b-5: (1) scheme to defraud, (2) misrepresen-

84

Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046.
Id. at 1048.
86
Id. at 1048 n.5.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1052–55.
91
Id. at 1051.
92
Id. “Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an
impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs
on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
85
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tation or omission, and (3) fraudulent course of business.’” Therefore, the court held that reliance will be presumed where a misrepresentation “necessarily resulted from the scheme and the defendant’s
conduct” and “was disseminated into an efficient market and was re94
flected in the market price.” The Ninth Circuit found that a plaintiff could show reliance on the deceptive acts of a secondary actor
even though no public misrepresentations are directly attributable to
95
that secondary actor.
B. The Bright-Line Rule: Regents of the University of California
96
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit holding in Simpson, the Fifth
Circuit held in Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First
Boston (USA), Inc. (“Credit Suisse”) that a secondary actor must actually
make a public, material representation to be found liable under §
97
10(b). Much like Simpson, Credit Suisse involved partnerships and
transactions engineered specifically for the purpose of inflating reve98
nue and taking liabilities off the books. In this case, Enron enlisted
Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch, and other investment banks in what has
99
become known as the “Nigerian Barges Transaction.” Enron wanted
to liquidate its interest in electricity-generating barges off the coast of
Nigeria in late 1999 so that it could increase its revenue for the quar100
ter and meet Wall Street expectations.
Enron solicited Merrill
Lynch to enter into a transaction pursuant to which Merrill Lynch
would purchase the barges and Enron would pay Merrill a premium
101
and repurchase the barges within the following six months. Merrill
purchased the barges, and Enron bought them back at a premium a
102
Enron then recorded the transaction, not as a
few months later.
93

Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051 (quoting 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS,
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7:469 (2d ed.
2006)).
94
Id. at 1052.
95
Id.
96
482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
97
Compare Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049 (articulating the rule that a public misstatement need not be attributed to the secondary actor to impose liability), with Credit
Suisse, 482 F.3d at 385–86 (articulating the rule that absent a duty to disclose, a public misstatement must be attributed to a secondary actor to impose liability).
98
Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 377.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
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loan, as would have been proper, but as a sale in order to boost its
103
1999 year end revenues. The plaintiffs alleged that the banks knew
that the purpose of these transactions was to raise revenue figures,
104
which would in turn increase the rate of executive compensation.
The court in Credit Suisse noted that the U.S. District Court of
the Southern District of Texas held that “rule 10b-5(a)’s prohibition
of ‘any scheme . . . to defraud’ gives rise to joint and several liability
for defendants who commit individual acts of deception in furtherance of such a scheme” on the theory that the banks had a duty not
105
to engage in a fraudulent scheme.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court decision and held that the plaintiffs failed to plead re106
The court realiance regarding the defendant’s deceptive acts.
soned that neither the presumption of reliance based on a duty to
disclose nor the presumption of reliance based on the theory of
107
fraud-on-the-market applied to the facts of the case.
First, the investment banks’ actions were not deceptive within the meaning of §
10(b) because the banks had no affirmative duty to disclose to
108
Enron’s investors. Second, the court argued that the district court’s
finding of reliance based on a theory of fraud-on-the-market was
wrong because “[t]o qualify for the [fraud-on-the-market] presumption [of reliance] . . . a plaintiff must not only indicate that a market
is efficient, but also must allege that the defendant made public and
material misrepresentations; i.e., the type of fraud on which an effi109
cient market may be presumed to rely.”
Because the defendant
banks in Credit Suisse only participated in the transactions and did not
make deceptive public misstatements on which the investors could
110
have relied, they could not be held liable under § 10(b).
This Comment is particularly concerned with the court’s holding with respect to fraud-on-the-market reliance because the Fifth
Circuit rejected the concept of reliance articulated by the Ninth Cir111
cuit in Simpson.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litiga-

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 377.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 385–86.
Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 388–90.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1826

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/8/2010 4:17 PM

[Vol. 40:1811

112

tion in which the court held that a public misstatement by a second113
ary actor is necessary for finding that secondary actor liable.
The
Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit applied different rules to very sim114
ilar fact patterns.
Thus, in examining Stoneridge, the question is
whether the Supreme Court actually resolved the disagreement
among the circuits over attaching liability to secondary actors in cases
where the secondary actors have no affirmative duty to disclose their
deception. This Comment takes the position that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Stoneridge has not resolved the disagreement; in
fact, it has only further muddied the waters.
IV. STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.L.C. V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA,
INC. AND SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY
A. The Facts and the History
Stoneridge involved a class-action lawsuit brought by shareholders
against Charter Communications and two of its equipment suppliers,
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, alleging that they had participated in
115
transactions which inflated revenue and cash flow statements.
In
late 2000, despite other efforts to manipulate its financial results—
including the delayed reporting of terminated customers, improper
capitalization of costs, and manipulation of billing cut-off dates to inflate its revenues—Charter’s revenue was still fifteen- to twentymillion dollars below Wall Street estimates for revenue and cash
116
flow.
To help make up the revenue shortfall, Charter decided to
modify its existing contractual arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta
and Motorola which both sold Charter the digital cable converter
117
boxes used by its cable subscribers.
Charter arranged to overpay
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola twenty dollars for each converter box
it purchased through the end of the year with the understanding that

112

443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 992 (“Any defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be
made a fraudulent statement or omission, or who does not directly engage in manipulative securities trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and abetting and cannot be held liable under § 10(b) or any subpart of Rule 10b-5.”).
114
Compare supra note 94 and accompanying text, with supra note 109 and accompanying text.
115
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766
(2008).
116
Id.
117
Id.
113

WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

COMMENT

11/8/2010 4:17 PM

1827

they would return the overpayment by purchasing advertisements
118
from Charter.
To mislead its accountant into certifying the revenue figures, including the fake advertising revenue, Charter requested that Scientific-Atlanta send documents stating that Scientific-Atlanta had increased production costs for the converter boxes by twenty dollars
119
per box, a request with which Scientific-Atlanta complied. Charter
also agreed in a written contract to purchase a specific number of settop boxes from Motorola with the expectation that it would not take
delivery of all the boxes and with the express provision that it would
120
pay Motorola liquidated damages of twenty dollars per unit. Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola then signed contracts with Charter to purchase advertising from Charter at a price higher than fair value,
which represented a return to Charter of the twenty dollar overpay121
ment it made for each set-top box. Charter backdated the advertising agreements to give the impression that they were negotiated separately from the agreements to overpay for the converter boxes and
therefore, represented two separate transactions, which was necessary
to allow Charter to record the advertising payments as revenue on its
122
financial statements.
Notably, however, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola played no role in preparing or disseminating Charter’s misleading financial statements, and their own financial statements
booked the transactions as a wash in accordance with generally ac123
cepted accounting principles.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
124
could be granted, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Central Bank provided the courts
with three guiding principles. The first is that a private plaintiff “may
not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by
125
the text of § 10(b).” Secondly, the court held that “[a] device . . . is
not ‘deceptive,’ within the meaning of § 10b, absent some misstate-

118

Id.
Id. at 767.
120
Id.
121
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 173 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119
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ment or failure to disclose by one who has a duty to disclose.”
Thirdly, the court ruled that the term “manipulative” in Rule 10b-5
127
has a limited contextual meaning.
Applying these principals to
Stoneridge, the Eighth Circuit held that neither Scientific-Atlanta nor
Motorola could have engaged in a deceptive act because neither
made a public misstatement and neither was under a duty to disclose
128
information about Charter’s financial health. Therefore, both were
129
merely aiders and abettors and could not be held liable.
Because
the Eighth Circuit’s ruling reflected the split among the circuits over
“when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to recover
from a party that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a
duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to violate § 10(b),”
130
the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear the case.
B. The Key Issue Identified by the Supreme Court in Stoneridge:
Reliance
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiffs in Stoneridge could
not attach liability to Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, the Supreme
Court focused on whether the plaintiffs had satisfied the reliance requirement (i.e. whether the investors’ reliance on the acts and statements of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola could be presumed even
131
though neither of them had made public misstatements).
The
plaintiffs argued that Charter’s public issuance of a misleading financial statement was “a natural and expected consequence of respondents’ deceptive acts” and that “Charter’s auditor would not have
been fooled, and the financial statement would have been a more accurate reflection of Charter’s financial condition” but for the assis132
tance provided by Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola. Essentially, they
argued that reliance can be found if the secondary actor is a “but for”
cause of the dissemination of a deceptive misstatement.

126

Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1977)).
Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476 (holding that manipulation is a term
of art that “refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity”)).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 767
(2008). Compare supra note 94 and accompanying text, with supra note 109 and accompanying text.
131
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
132
Id. at 770.
127
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The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they
133
relied on the deceptive acts of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.
Generally speaking, to find that the investors in Charter stock relied
on Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola’s deceptive acts, the investors
would have had to show “the ‘requisite causal connection between a
134
defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.’”
The Supreme Court explained that there are two ways to establish the causal
135
connection and demonstrate reliance. First, if a party with a duty to
disclose omits a material fact, the investor to whom the duty was owed
does not need to provide specific proof of reliance because reliance is
136
presumed in such situations.
Second, reliance is presumed under
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine when material misstatements be137
come public.
Concluding that the defendants had no duty to disclose, the Court focused on the second method of satisfying the reliance requirement: the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
138
reliance.
The Court found that the defendants’ deceptive acts, namely
taking part in the sham transactions and drafting documents to codify those transactions, and the public statements made by Charter
were “too remote” from plaintiffs’ losses to satisfy the reliance re139
quirement via a fraud-on-the-market presumption.
The majority
posited that investors do not rely on the transactions reflected in financial statements and that such a concept of reliance would result in
attaching liability to the entire marketplace in which the company is140
suing securities does business. The Court concluded that “nothing
respondents did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to record
the transactions as it did” and, therefore, the plaintiffs did not satisfy
141
the reliance requirement.
At the same time, however, the Court
explained that its conclusion should not be “read to suggest there
must be a specific oral or written statement before there could be lia-

133

Id.
Id. at 769 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)).
135
Id.
136
Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54
(1972)).
137
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 247).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 770.
134
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bility under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,” and it explicitly noted that
142
“[c]onduct itself can be deceptive.”
C. The Scope of Secondary-Actor Liability Remains Undefined: The
Supreme Court Did Not Close the Door on Secondary-Actor Liability
Although it restricted the scope of secondary-actor liability outlined in Central Bank, the Supreme Court did not clearly resolve the
dispute between the circuits by simply choosing the bright-line rule
over the scheme liability concept or one of the other tests. By saying
that “specific oral or written [mis]statement[s]” are not necessary for
143
a finding of liability, the Supreme Court essentially refused to
uphold a key feature of the of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Credit
144
Suisse and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Charter Communications.
At the same time, however, the Court said that it could not hold a
secondary actor liable unless its deceptive acts made a primary actor’s
145
statement “necessary or inevitable” (i.e., not “too remote”). Implicit in this statement is the conclusion that if Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola’s actions in Stoneridge had made it “necessary or inevitable
for Charter to record the transactions as it did,” the reliance requirement would have been satisfied and liability would have at146
tached to their actions.
The Court’s language thus supports the
proposition that secondary-actor/scheme liability still exists in some,
147
albeit a limited, form. As one commentator wrote,
[t]hus the answer to the question certified for review—whether
an injured investor “may rely upon § 10(b) to recover from a par142

Id. at 769.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
144
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d
987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006).
145
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
146
Id.
147
See DAVID WILTENBERG, SUPREME COURT’S LATEST WORD ON PRIVATE SECURITIES
FRAUD CLAIMS: STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC V. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC. 4–
5 (LEXIS 2008), 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1861 (“But what if, in some alternate Stoneridge, information about the deceptive acts actually had been communicated – could
such acts be ‘deceptive’ for § 10(b) purposes and thus the predicate for a primary
violation? This was the question the Eighth Circuit had answered in the negative and
which the Supreme Court was not compelled to reach. Having noted that the suppliers’ ‘course of conduct included both oral and written statements, such as the
backdated contracts,’ the Court could have based its affirmance on the absence of
reliance alone. Justice Kennedy nevertheless addressed the question squarely, and
squarely rejected as ‘erroneous’ the view impliedly adopted by the Eighth Circuit, in
language destined to be quoted in future cases: ‘Conduct itself can be deceptive.’”)
(citations omitted).
143
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ty that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a duty to
disclose but does participate in a scheme”—appears to be “Yes,
provided investors actually or presumptively rely upon the party’s
148
conduct.”

The statutes and accompanying rules buttress the theory that
liability can still be attached to secondary actors who do not issue
public misstatements. First, reading the Stoneridge decision along with
the statutory language found in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provides further evidence in support of the proposition that the Supreme Court
could not have intended to make a public misstatement a prerequi149
site for liability. Only Rule 10b-5(b) makes a misstatement grounds
150
for liability; the other parts of the rule do not.
Rule 10b-5(a), together with § 10(b), makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or indi151
rectly . . . to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” Rule
10b-5(c) makes it unlawful “to engage in any act, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any per152
son.”
A simple reading of the statute and the rule demonstrates
153
that a misstatement is not the only basis for liability.
As one commentator asked, “Why else, in fact, would there be subsections (a)
and (c) if not meant to cover some acts different, and totally apart,
154
from (b)?”
He went on to argue that “[s]urely, ‘indirectly’ means
155
something.”
Second, when § 10(b) says “any person, directly or indirectly,” it
156
implicitly brings secondary actors within the scope of liability.
In
light of Central Bank, which held that secondary-actor liability exists,
reading the statute and the accompanying rules otherwise would be
157
erroneous. In Stoneridge, Justice Kennedy wrote that misstatements
are not necessary for liability and that “[c]onduct itself can be decep-

148

Id. at 5.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2010).
150
Id. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c).
151
§ 240.10b-5(a) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
152
§ 240.10b-5(c).
153
See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[N]either the SEC nor this
Court has ever held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security in order to run afoul of the act.”).
154
Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge – Escape From Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active,
Intentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170, 182 (2008).
155
Id.
156
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (emphasis added).
157
See discussion supra Part II.C for an analysis of the Central Bank decision.
149
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158

tive.” Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in conjunction with the
statute, the accompanying SEC rules, and the existing case law demonstrate that liability should still attach to a secondary actor who perpetrates a fraud by engaging in deceptive acts even if those acts do
not include the actual issuance of a misstatement into the public do159
main. With the door not completely closed on secondary-actor liability, the judiciary and investors alike are left with the following question: when are the deceptive acts of a secondary actor not “too
remote” from the losses incurred by the investors to impute reliance
and attach liability to that secondary actor?
D. The Open Question: How Do Post-Stoneridge Plaintiffs Satisfy the
Reliance Requirement?
The Court’s reasoning in Stoneridge indicates that it was concerned that an overly broad concept of reliance would result in liability attaching to a multitude of parties engaged in ordinary business
160
transactions with the securities issuer. The majority clearly does not
want courts to cast a wide net, ensnaring legitimate businessmen into
a maelstrom of liability when the links between the deceptive conduct
161
and the investors’ losses are far too attenuated.
If, however, the
Court’s answer to the question is that liability can be attached only
when public misstatements are the necessary and inevitable result of
the secondary actor’s deceptive acts, the lower courts are left to determine the sets of factual circumstances under which deceptive acts
make a public misstatement necessary or inevitable.
In requiring that the public misstatements must be the necessary
or inevitable result of the secondary actor’s deceptive acts, the Supreme Court has left a finding of reliance difficult to envision.
Commentators have noted that “it is difficult to conceive how the test
could ever be satisfied short of an actor’s either making false statements, failing to make statements it was obliged to make, or engaging
in traditionally proscribed market manipulation that is the equivalent

158

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769
(2008).
159
See Sinai, supra note 154, at 181–82 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 651 (1997)).
160
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770 (“Were this concept of reliance to be adopted,
the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing
company does business . . . .”).
161
See id.
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162

thereof.” Only two days after the Supreme Court issued the Stoneridge decision, however, the lead plaintiffs in Credit Suisse petitioned
the Court for a writ of certiorari in hopes that the Court would clarify
the scope of secondary liability in their favor, but the Court denied
163
certiorari.
The Credit Suisse petition serves to highlight the unsettled nature
of the law with respect to secondary-actor liability. The lead plaintiffs
in Credit Suisse argued,
[F]ar from warranting a denial of certiorari, this Court’s decision
in Stoneridge demonstrates critical differences between Enron and
Stoneridge—differences that warrant a grant of certiorari to determine § 10(b)’s scope not in the context of ordinary business
transactions addressed by Stoneridge, but in the context of fraud
perpetrated by financial professionals engaged in fraudulent deal164
ings in our securities markets.

In an attempt to contrast the Stoneridge investors’ lack of reliance
on suspicious transactions in the marketplace for goods and services
with transactions taking place in the investment sphere, the lead
plaintiff’s brief further noted that Stoneridge does not rule out liability
for fraud by financial professionals that is directed at securities markets (e.g., schemes designed to inflate a company’s quarterly and
165
year-end revenue figures).
The plaintiff argued that the scope of
secondary-actor liability in Stoneridge should be read to include “an
underwriter who knowingly underwrites a fraudulent offering and deliberately disseminates fraudulent offering documents, selling securi166
ties to the public.” Implicit in the plaintiff’s argument in the Credit
Suisse petition for writ of certiorari is the conclusion that the reliance
requirement is satisfied and liability should be found in cases where
secondary actors are intimately involved in activities closely related to
the issuance and sale of securities. After all, it would seem reasonable
to conclude that investors do in fact rely on the integrity of those who
play vital roles in drafting financial documents and who do just about
everything with respect to the creation of the documents except at167
tach their names to or directly disseminate such documents. In any
162

EVAN A. DAVIS, MITCHELL A. LOWENTHAL & NANCY I. RUSKIN, DAVIS, LOWENTHAL,
& RUSKIN ON STONERIDGE INVESTMENT LLC V. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC. 5 (LEXIS
2008), 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1880.
163
Id.
164
Supplemental Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008) (No. 06-1341).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 3.
167
See discussion infra Part VII.
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case, the petition for a writ of certiorari in the Credit Suisse case was
likely only the first in what will amount to a multitude of attempts by
plaintiffs’ lawyers to get the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of
secondary liability and, more specifically, to address the circumstances under which the reliance requirement would be deemed satis168
fied in secondary actor cases.
V. THE EXISTING TESTS FOR SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY DO NOT
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS STONERIDGE’S CONCERNS ABOUT RELIANCE
Existing tests for imposing liability on secondary actors are instructive, but they do not provide a framework for satisfying the reliance requirements of Stoneridge and therefore do not avail a method
of recovery against secondary actors. The major tests for secondaryactor liability—namely, the substantial-participation test, the brightline rule, and the creator test—are unworkable in light of Justice
169
Kennedy’s opinion.
A plaintiff satisfying either the substantialparticipation test or the creator test will likely fail to impose liability
on a secondary actor for lack of a causal link between the secondary
actor’s deceptive acts and the primary actor’s misstatement on which
170
the investing public is presumed to rely. Similarly, the existing concept of scheme liability does not adequately address the Court’s concerns about the causal relationship between the secondary actor’s involvement in the fraudulent scheme and the public release of a
171
misleading statement.
By contrast, the bright-line rule would seemingly nullify secondary-actor liability altogether with its requirement
that the plaintiff must attribute a public misstatement to the defen172
dant to impose liability for a violation of Rule 10b-5.
A.

The Substantial-Participation Test Does Not Provide a Basis for Imputing
Reliance

The substantial-participation test implicates actors who are intricately involved in the preparation of fraudulent documents “even
though [their] participation might not lead to the [primary] actor’s

168
JAMES L. STENGEL, STEVEN J. FINK AND KRISTEN R. FOURNIER, STONERIDGE
INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC V. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC. 4–5 (LEXIS 2008), 2008
EMERGING ISSUES 1881 (“It seems certain that creative plaintiffs will continue to press
one or more variants of the scheme liability theory, using as a springboard the
Court’s statement that ‘[c]onduct itself can be deceptive . . . .’”).
169
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
170
See discussion infra Part V.A–B.
171
See discussion infra Part V.D.
172
See discussion infra Part V.C.
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173

actual making of the statements.” As one commentator has noted,
the substantial-participation test employs a shifting and highly factoriented determination of what constitutes substantial participation;
many courts have applied this standard on an ad-hoc basis, which has
thus offered little predictive value to those secondary actors who want
to be sure that their actions are not causing the perpetration of
174
fraud.
Stoneridge, however, makes direct causation of the public
misstatement a prerequisite for imputing reliance and imposing lia175
bility in the secondary actor context. The substantial-participation
test is thus untenable in the post-Stoneridge environment because it
would potentially impose liability on those whose deceptive conduct
176
falls short of directly causing a misstatement to be made public.
B. The SEC’s Creator Test Does Not Provide a Basis for Imputing
Reliance
The creator test proposed by the SEC is untenable for reasons
similar to those which make the substantial-participation test unworkable in the post-Stoneridge world. Although the creator standard reflects an attempt by the SEC to craft a compromise “between the
bright line standard’s limited attribution rule and the specter of unlimited liability arguably inherent in the application of the substantial
participation standard,” such a test would potentially impose liability
on anyone who plays a role in authoring a public misstatement even
177
though that person plays no role in its dissemination.
One commentator posited that “when disclosure results from the collaborative
efforts of a number of people . . . the SEC’s creator standard fails to
178
provide a workable framework for analysis.”
The publication of a
misstatement is not the necessary or inevitable result of its creation.
Actors other than the creator of the misstatement, such as the actor
who edits the document or the actor who offers feedback on the
179
document, often determine whether the misstatement is published.
Imposing liability on the basis of someone’s status as the author of
173

Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
Cosenza, supra note 72, at 32–33.
175
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,
770 (2008); see also id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority’s “super-causation” view of reliance).
176
See Cosenza, supra note 72, at 43–44 (citing Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769) (noting
that actions in an indirect chain are too remote for imposing liability under Stoneridge).
177
Id. at 22.
178
Id. at 38.
179
Id.
174
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the misstatement would thus be problematic because it would potentially implicate actors who are unhinged from the causal chain and
too far removed from the issuance of a misleading statement. The
creator test, therefore, runs afoul of the requirement that the secondary actor’s deceptive conduct must be causally linked to the dis180
semination of the misstatement.
C. The Bright-Line Rule Is Incompatible with Stoneridge
Despite all of the rejoicing among those in the corporate defense bar who view Stoneridge as a big win for securities fraud defen181
dants, the close reading of Stoneridge advocated by this Comment
reveals that the bright-line rule is incompatible with the decision in
Stoneridge. Stoneridge, which states that it would be erroneous “to suggest that there must be a specific oral or written statement before
182
there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,” directly conflicts with the language found in cases articulating a bright-line rule
183
like Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. Wright held that for the plaintiff
to satisfy the reliance requirement and attach liability, a public miss184
tatement must be attributable to the secondary actor.
For the
Court in Stoneridge, the question is not whether there is a public miss185
tatement; that is not necessary for a finding of liability. The crucial
question is whether the secondary actor’s deceptive acts “have the requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm” to satisfy the re186
liance requirement. Therefore, in so far as it requires the plaintiff
to show that the secondary actor actually issued a public statement

180

See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770; see also id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority’s “super-causation” view of reliance).
181
WILTENBERG, supra note 147, at 1 (“The 5-3 decision, authored by Justice Kennedy, has been heralded as closing the door on a wide variety of fraud claims against
secondary actors . . . .”); see JAMES A. FANTO, JAMES FANTO ON THE “BAD APPLES”
PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE SCANDALS 4 (LEXIS 2008) 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1817
(“The Stoneridge decision may thus be a Pyrrhic victory for business and financial professionals.”).
182
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
183
152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
184
Id. (“‘[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually
make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).
Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b)’. .
. . [A] secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a statement
not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination. Such a holding would
circumvent the reliance requirements of the Act . . . .”) (citations omitted).
185
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
186
Id. at 769.
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him or herself, the bright-line rule is too restrictive.
Such a requirement does not comport with the pronouncement that “conduct
188
itself can be deceptive” articulated by Justice Kennedy in Stoneridge.
In fact, such a rule is incompatible with the very existence of secondary-actor liability because secondary actors like lawyers, accountants,
and investment bankers do not issue statements directly to the investing public but rather play a behind the scenes role, assisting those
who do.
D. The Concept of Scheme Liability Is Incompatible with Stoneridge
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Simpson, the Supreme Court in Stoneridge held that in cases where a secondary actor has no duty to disclose, reliance cannot be presumed, and thus, liability cannot be
found simply because secondary actors purposefully engage in conduct that has the principal effect of creating a false appearance of
189
material fact.
In Stoneridge, both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
played a significant role in perpetrating the fraud on Charter investors by actively participating in the sham transactions that made the
190
fraudulent misrepresentation possible.
Therefore, the Stoneridge
defendants would have been found liable under § 10(b) if the Court
had employed the scheme-liability concept. The Court, however, determined that the plaintiffs did not rely on the defendants’ actions
because their actions did not make the misstatement on which the
191
investors relied necessary or inevitable. In the eyes of the Court, a
sufficient causal nexus did not exist between Scientific-Atlanta’s and
Motorola’s actions and the release of the misleading cash flow state192
ments.
The concept of scheme liability based on a principal purpose and effect test is thus incompatible with what Justice Steven’s
dissenting opinion calls Stoneridge’s “super-causation” standard for re193
Future plaintiffs, who simply allege that a secondary actor
liance.
acted with the principal purpose and effect of creating a public miss187

Schanbaum, supra note 70, at 198–99.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
189
Compare id. at 770 (explaining that acting with the principal purpose and effect
of creating a false appearance of material fact is insufficient to impose liability), with
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128
S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (explaining that secondary-actor liability can be predicated on
conduct that has the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of
material fact).
190
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
191
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
192
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
193
See id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188
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tatement, will fail to establish the causal nexus necessary for the court
194
to impute reliance.
In the brief period since the Court issued the Stoneridge decision,
scholars have noted the insufficiency of scheme liability. One commentator has opined that similar to the other existing tests for secondary-actor liability, “scheme liability focuses on the actions and intent of the secondary actor rather than on whether the secondary
actor has engaged in conduct upon which a plaintiff could presump195
tively rely.” Even advocates of scheme liability point out that there
is but a thin distinction between scheme liability’s purpose-and-effect
196
test and the standard scienter requirement of securities fraud. The
purpose-and-effect test, its supporters say, is designed to determine
whether the secondary actor’s conduct was sufficiently deceptive to
197
warrant liability. Thus, while the scheme-liability concept may identify conduct that is sufficiently deceptive within the meaning of Rule
10b-5, it does not identify the causal relationship between the secondary actor’s conduct and the primary actor’s issuance of a material
misstatement. A framework that does not adequately focus on that
causal relationship is unlikely to pass muster under Stoneridge because
it will be viewed as opening the litigation flood gates to actions
against secondary actors who are, in the Court’s eyes, too remote
from the primary violator’s conduct. As one article has noted, “it is
clear that the Court intended to eliminate scheme liability because
the Court was concerned that it would expand the implied cause of
action” to secondary actors who merely aid and abet the primary vi198
olator in releasing public misstatements.
The result is that courts
are left without a workable framework for imputing reliance and attaching liability in the secondary actor context.
The goal of this Comment, therefore, is to propose a test that
the courts can employ in cases involving secondary actors who engage
in deceptive acts within the ambit of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 but who
do not have a duty to disclose their activities and do not directly make
a public misstatement. Such a test for imputing reliance and imposing liability must fit within the narrow parameters outlined by Justice
Kennedy in Stoneridge, which dictate that reliance on the secondary
actor’s conduct will only be presumed when the secondary actor’s deceptive acts clearly make the primary actor’s issuance of a material
194
195
196
197
198

See id.
Chrisman, supra note 1, at 866.
Schanbaum, supra note 70, at 230–31.
Id.
Chrisman, supra note 1, at 879.
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199

misstatement necessary or inevitable.
In other words, the defendant-secondary actor’s deceptive acts and the public misstatement
made by the primary actor must be sufficiently close (or not too remote) to allow the court to impute reliance and attach liability. No
longer is the defendant’s “but for” causation of the plaintiff investor’s
200
losses sufficient to satisfy the reliance requirement. To establish reliance on the defendant’s deceptive acts, plaintiffs must now show
201
that the defendant’s acts were a proximate cause of their losses.
Thus, a proper test will allow the courts to determine whether a direct causal connection exists between the conduct of the defendantsecondary actor and the public’s reliance on a misstatement issued by
the primary actor. Satisfaction of such a test will enable the complaining investor to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
202
reliance outlined in Basic.
VI. PROPOSED TEST: A TWO-PRONGED CAUSE AND EFFECT TEST
The aim of the proposed test is to provide courts with a framework for identifying factual situations where the defendant-secondary
actor’s deceptive acts and the primary actor’s public misstatement are
so closely linked that the secondary actor’s actions are akin to releasing a misleading statement on which the public is presumed to rely.
In other words, the test will identify those situations where a misleading public statement can appropriately be attributed to the secondary
actor even though it is the primary actor who actually issues the misstatement. The test is a two-pronged, cause-and-effect, fact-based test.
First, the cause prong focuses on the purposeful conduct of the secondary actor and the extent to which it caused the primary actor to
make a material, public misstatement. Second, the test focuses on
the effect of the fraud resulting from the secondary actor’s conduct
and the extent to which the secondary actor accrued a material benefit from the fraud. This Comment argues that plaintiffs can satisfy
the causation-intensive reliance requirement of Stoneridge by demonstrating that the defendant-secondary actors engaged in intentional
conduct calculated to cause the public issuance of a misstatement
and by showing that the secondary actor gained a material benefit as
a result of his or her active role in the fraud.
199

See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
Inc., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing “but for” causation); Binder v. Gillespie,
184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
201
STENGEL, FINK & FOURNIER, supra note 168, at 5.
202
See supra note 6.
200
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A. The Cause: Intentional Steps Above and Beyond Drafting
Documents
In the wake of Stoneridge, plaintiffs must now do more than show
that the fraud was a result of the secondary actor’s deceptive conduct.
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the secondary actor’s deceptive acts
made it necessary or inevitable that the primary violator’s public miss203
tatement would be made.
Therefore, the cause prong of the test
requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of a direct causal
connection between the secondary actor’s deceptive acts and the
primary actor’s public misstatement on which the plaintiff investor
presumably relied in making his or her investment decisions.
Satisfying the cause prong depends on the extent of the role the
conduct played in making the material misstatement a reality. The
first prong of the test for establishing reliance is met when a plaintiff
alleges that the secondary actor engaged in purposeful conduct that
actually caused the primary actor to make a public misstatement affecting the value of securities. The fact that a lawyer, accountant, or
some other secondary actor purposefully put pen to paper and
204
drafted a misstatement would be insufficient. The plaintiff must establish that the secondary actor took a series of purposeful steps from
the point of drafting the misstatement to its actual release to ensure
the achievement of his fraudulent designs. Such a series of critical,
affirmative steps above and beyond simply drafting the misstatement
could include encouraging the primary actor to release the misstatement, counseling the primary actor on the institutionalization of a
process enabling the dissemination of false or misleading statements,
otherwise facilitating misstatements, or pressuring the client to make
misleading statements.
The idea is not completely theoretical. Secondary actors have
often gone beyond “acquiescing” in the demands of their clients.
Many instances have occurred where auditors, insurers, and investment bankers have specifically designed structures to facilitate misrepresentation of material facts concerning a company’s financial con205
dition and openly marketed them to their clients. Several examples
are worth noting. Citigroup developed a plan to sell other companies on Enron-style schemes, which included a presentation on trans203

See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
See discussion supra Part V.D.
205
Brief for Arkansas, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and the New York State Common
Retirement Fund, et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Stoneridge
Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 0643).
204
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actions described as balance-sheet friendly and advertisements promoting the use of a special purpose entity operated by Citigroup to
206
effect such transactions.
The scheme advertised would in effect
make certain commodities trades appear as though they were inde207
pendent and unrelated even though they were not. Arthur Andersen, the now defunct accounting firm, developed a white paper that
explained how to circumvent certain accounting standards to create
208
fictitious revenue.
A.I.G., the insurance giant, paid $10 million to
the SEC to settle a charge that it had “played an indispensible part” in
a fraud by selling an insurance product “A.I.G. had developed and
marketed for the specific purpose of helping issuers to report false
209
financial information to the public.”
More recently, Lehman Brothers used misleading accounting
and legal maneuvers to disguise its true financial health as the credit
crisis of 2008 began to unfold. In fact, shortly before its demise in
September 2008, Lehman Brothers used repurchase agreements
210
(“repos”) to temporarily move toxic securities off its balance sheet
and reduce leverage in an effort to foster the false perception among
investors that it had sold such securities and was on a strong financial
211
footing.
Notably, Lehman Brothers sought a law firm that would
206

The Role of Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. of Investigations of the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Robert L. Roach, Chief Investigator, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations).
207
Id.
208
Dennis K. Berman, Julia Angwin & Chip Cummins, Tricks of the Trade: As Market
Bubble Neared End, Bogus Swaps Provided a Lift, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at A1.
209
Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Wants a Monitor to Examine A.I.G.’s Books, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at C1.
210
A repurchase agreement is one in which a firm transfers an asset to a third party as collateral for a short-term borrowing but agrees to repay the cash and take back
the collateral at a certain point in the future. See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, at 732 n.2848, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. March
10, 2010) (08-13555). Lehman Brothers often transferred securities to its European
subsidiaries in intracompany “Repo 105” transfers. See id. at 786.
211
See id. at 732–39. The examiner reported,
Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days
prior to reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage
and balance sheet. Lehman’s periodic reports did not disclose the
cash borrowing from the Repo 105 transaction – i.e., although Lehman
had in effect borrowed tens of billions of dollars in these transactions,
Lehman did not disclose the known obligation to repay the debt.
Lehman used the cash from the Repo 105 transaction to pay down
other liabilities, thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total
assets reported on its balance sheet and lowering its leverage ratios. . . .
Lehman never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 transactions, its
accounting treatment for these transactions, the considerable escala-
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provide an opinion letter stating that these transactions were true
212
sales (i.e., not short-term loan agreements).
The legal opinion
passing on the repurchase scheme was certainly a critical part of
Lehman Brothers’ ultimately failed effort to hide from market view
its vast stockpile of illiquid securities and the true extent of its indeb213
tedness. The Lehman Brothers debacle thus further illustrates the
direct effect that the work of secondary actors, like law firms, have on
financial markets.
While the culpability of the aforementioned actors and the specific details of their conduct is not the concern of this Comment, if
their actions were intentionally calculated to complete a fraudulent
scheme, then such conduct clearly would establish a direct causal
connection between the secondary actor’s conduct and the release of
214
the statement on which the investors relied.

tion of its total Repo 105 usage in late 2007 and into 2008, or the material impact these transactions had on the firm’s publicly reported net
leverage ratio.
Id. at 732–34 (internal footnotes omitted). The assets Lehman Brothers transferred
as part of these repurchase transactions included commercial mortgage-backed securities, sub-prime mortgages, and leveraged loans. Id. at 738–37. In the second
quarter of 2008, Lehman Brothers temporarily removed as much as $50.38 billion in
securities from its balance sheet. Id. at 742.
212
See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, supra note 210, at 740.
213
In order to classify the repurchase agreements as true sales for accounting
purposes, Lehman Brothers had to book the underlying transactions as true sales at
law. Id. at 782–83. Generally speaking, repurchase transactions cannot be treated as
sales in the United States because U.S. attorneys cannot furnish true sale opinion letters under U.S. law. Id. at 784. Therefore, Lehman Brothers engaged Linklaters, a
British law firm, to analyze the transactions under English law for one of its European subsidiaries through which it executed these repurchase transactions. See id. at
740, 782–86. Notably, Lehman Brothers failed to notify its investors that it recorded
the repurchase transactions as true sales on the basis of an English legal opinion, not
U.S. law. See id. at 987. This Comment does not mean to suggest that the opinion
letter provided by Linklaters was improper; it merely raises this issue to point out that
the work of secondary actors, like law firms, has a direct effect on financial markets.
214
Distinguishing a legitimate business arrangement between the secondary and
primary actor that happens to facilitate fraud and one that encompasses intentional
actions calculated to effectuate fraud will not always be an easy task. Certain actions
that constitute purposeful steps to achieve fraudulent designs in some cases may be
completely innocent in others. See Taavi Annus, Note, Scheme Liability Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 MO. L. REV. 855, 883–90 (2007) (discussing the difficulties associated with distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate
business transactions entered by secondary actors, such as major investment banks).
Nevertheless, the scienter requirement of securities fraud actions stands as a bulwark
against implicating innocent parties and will necessarily resolve such difficulties.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (Scienter is the “intent to
deceive, defraud, or manipulate.”).
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B. The Effect: Defrauded Investors and an Enriched Secondary Actor
The second part of this new test for imputing reliance and imposing liability in secondary actor cases requires a showing that the
secondary actor actually received some material benefit as a result of
his or her participation in the fraudulent scheme. Post-Stoneridge, establishing that the secondary actor was enriched by the fraud he perpetrated is crucial because of the Court’s concern that the plaintiffs’
injuries were too far removed from the defendants’ deceptive acts to
215
enable the court to find some connection between the two. Showing that the defendant-secondary actor was directly enriched by the
fraudulent scheme overcomes Justice Kennedy’s concern about remoteness, demonstrating how involved the secondary actor was in the
public misstatement on which the investor relied and how likely it was
that a public misstatement would be made. If a secondary actor has a
sizeable financial gain or loss at stake in the fraud, the fraudulent
public misstatement can become the “necessary or inevitable” result
of the secondary actor’s deceptive acts. This is because without such
a material misstatement by the primary actor, the secondary actor
would not have been able to achieve his or her ends.
Situations in which secondary actors derive a material benefit
from the deceptive acts are distinguishable from the Stoneridge case.
In Stoneridge, no facts exist in the record to indicate that ScientificAtlanta and Motorola derived any material benefit from participating
216
in the sham transactions. Both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola had
existing contractual arrangements with Charter, and no evidence indicated that the contracts were ever contingent upon their participa217
tion in the scheme.
Notably, however, while direct evidence may
not have existed to explain why Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola participated in Charter’s scheme, the defendants may have profited nonetheless through a quid pro quo relationship which ensured that Charter would continue to buy the defendants’ products, and “that
someday Charter [might] return the favor when the scheming com-

215
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,
770 (2008) (“[R]eliance is tied to causation, leading to the inquiry whether respondents’ acts were immediate or remote to the injury.”).
216
See id. at 766–67. “Charter arranged to overpay respondents $20 for each set
top box it purchased until the end of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter.” Id. at
766. “And their [referring to Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc.] own financial statements booked the transactions as a wash, under generally accepted accounting principles.” Id. at 767.
217
See id. at 761.
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panies needed to pad their own books to deceive shareholders.”
Nevertheless, even if the defendants profited indirectly they would
avoid liability under the proposed test because it requires evidence of
a direct material benefit. In future cases, plaintiffs seeking recovery
under the proposed test would have to show that the secondary actors
received a real, tangible benefit for their deceptive acts, such as new
business contracts, alteration of existing contracts to include more favorable terms, or satisfaction of loan obligations that otherwise would
have become bad debts. By requiring the plaintiffs to show that the
secondary actor defendants actually received a benefit from actively
promoting the fraud, the test ensures that liability will only be imposed when the fraud is closely connected to a secondary actor’s deceptive conduct.
VII. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED TEST
The overarching rationale supporting this proposed test is, of
course, the continued need for secondary-actor liability. The reality
is that shareholders of a company and the investing public at large do
219
rely on the actions of secondary actors. Average investors have neither the time nor the resources to research every aspect of every
220
company.
The result is public reliance on a company’s financial
statements, regulatory filings, annual reports, and the opinions of the
221
These reports, which require the involveinvestment community.
ment of secondary actors, affect the movement of securities’ prices on
222
a daily basis. Secondary actors thus have a crucial impact on securities markets, whether they are lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, or others in the business community. This impact justifies an endeavor to clarify the reliance framework in the post-Stoneridge
environment and ensure that plaintiffs can recover against culpable
secondary actors.
Adopting the test proposed in this Comment will allow courts to
impute reliance and attach secondary-actor liability while also ensuring that liability is not imposed on parties that are innocent or only
tangentially connected to the fraud. In requiring a plaintiff to show
that the defendant-secondary actor took additional steps beyond
simply drafting the misstatement released by the primary actor, the

218
219
220
221
222

Gomm, supra note 12, at 479.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cause prong of this test goes beyond the tests employed before Stone223
ridge.
It allows the courts to identify situations in which the misstatement should be attributed to the secondary actor because, except
for signing the document and transmitting it to the key financial
news networks, the secondary actor took the critical steps necessary to
ensure that the misleading statement would be released to the investing public. The test effectively places the culpable secondary actor in
the shoes of the primary actor for purposes of presuming reliance
under Stoneridge, and it provides the courts with a clear strategy for
avoiding the inequitable and unfair conclusion that a secondary actor
can avoid liability simply because he did not imprint his name on a
public document for which he was otherwise responsible. At the
same time, however, by focusing on whether the secondary actor actually caused a misrepresentation, the proposed test ensures that the
scope of liability is not over-encompassing.
In addition to clarifying the reliance requirement in a balanced
fashion, the proposed two-pronged test responds to other policy concerns as well. The proposed test will discourage secondary actors
from entering into relationships with primary actors that promote
fraud and encourage secondary actors to ferret out such fraudulent
activities. Secondary actors such as law firms and auditors perform
functions (“e.g., designing transactions, drafting press releases and
prospectuses, and producing non-public opinions for issuers and underwriters”) that are critical to the ability of companies to execute
224
transactions.
Without the honest services of secondary actors like
law firms and auditors, managers of publicly traded companies can
more easily inflate revenue and engage in other efforts to perpetrate
225
fraud.
The corporate scandals of the past decade have illustrated the
failure of professional service providers to block the fraudulent en226
deavors of corporate management. After all, secondary actors, such
as lawyers and accountants, have an incentive to acquiesce in clients’
demands to assist with the preparation and dissemination of miss227
tatements: fees. Primary violators can “easily threaten to take their
business elsewhere” when a secondary actor expresses an unwilling223

See discussion supra Part VI.A.
Brief for Council of Institutional Investors et. al. as Amicus Curae Supporting
Petitioners at 4, Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128
S. Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43).
225
Id. at 5.
226
Id. at 4.
227
Id. at 6.
224
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ness to participate in a fraudulent scheme.
Absent the specter of
liability, the drive for profit on the part of the secondary actors will
encourage the perpetration of fraud on the part of secondary actors.
The test proposed in this Comment focuses squarely on the profit
229
motive of the secondary actor.
By holding those who extract material gain from fraudulent schemes accountable, the test will thwart
secondary actors who are lured by a desire to obtain or retain the
business of those bent on engaging in fraud.
VIII. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADOPTING THE PROPOSED TEST
A principal public policy argument against enacting the proposed test may be that even though the test is designed to impose liability only on the most culpable actors, the adoption of the test will
lead to a litigation explosion by attracting potential plaintiffs who
previously thought that Stoneridge precluded them from filing suits
230
against secondary actors. Some might argue that the proposed test
will open the flood gates to litigation because it ensures a measure of
231
liability for deceptive acts even when there is no duty to disclose.
Members of the securities industry contend that “[i]f Section 10(b)
did not require that duty as a condition to liability in the nondisclosure context, every routine commercial or financial transaction with a
public issuer would become a minefield of private securities-fraud
232
liability exposure.”
Litigation abuse might then become an even
more significant problem for the securities industry in situations
much like the one the market faced in Fall 2008:
In the context of securities class actions, a variety of factors combine to ensure that (i) class litigation is routinely brought in the
wake of large or precipitous drops in the stock price of a publicly
traded company, and (ii) a large portion of filed actions that sur228

Id.
See discussion supra Part VI.B.
230
See Gomm, supra note 12, at 454–55 (“This article argues that while Stoneridge
has further empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) in its
mandate to police the securities market, it has also left a discouraging and confusing
result for injured shareholders who want to seek private restitution for their losses.
The result appears to be that, so long as companies do not disclose the public truth
behind sham contracts and transactions in which they have participated (thereby
causing reliance), the companies probably will not be vulnerable to private actions
from shareholders.”).
231
See generally Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
and Futures Industry Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13,
Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008) (No. 06-43) [hereinafter Brief for the Securities Industry].
232
Id. at 3.
229
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vive motions to dismiss settle before their merits are ever tested
233
before a neutral trier of fact.

Therefore, creating a model by which plaintiffs can show reliance
might only serve to encourage plaintiffs to file suits against numerous
234
secondary actors.
Aside from arguing that the test itself is balanced and targeted at
only those who have directly caused a fraudulent misrepresentation,
this Comment counters that the lack of a clear framework for imputing reliance in the wake of Stoneridge will cause an uptick in litigation,
and the proposed test is what is needed to reduce meritless claims.
While the majority in Stoneridge was driven by policy concerns about
the scope of liability in securities cases and was motivated by a dislike
of the implied right of action under § 10(b), “the opinion raises
235
many more questions than it does answers.” The result is that the
plaintiffs’ bar has already begun crafting new arguments explaining
why they are entitled to a presumption of reliance, though with li236
mited success to be sure.
Nevertheless, the possibility of litigation
proceeding past the initial pleading stage remains in light of Stone237
In reridge’s fact-specific application of the reliance requirement.
sponse to the uncertainty Stoneridge has engendered, the proposed
test posits a clear framework that plaintiffs can use to determine
when their claims are actually viable. Such a test will, therefore, limit
the lawsuits to those situations where plaintiffs can plead that the
named secondary actor defendant caused the fraudulent misrepresentation which resulted in financial injury.
The second principal challenge that the proposed test will face is
the argument that it is unnecessary because the SEC has already been
238
tasked with prosecuting secondary actors. The SEC, however, disagrees with this contention and argues that private litigation against
secondary actors is necessary to prevent flagrant violations of securities laws because the SEC cannot possibly investigate and impose

233
Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 6–7, Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43).
234
See Brief for the Securities Industry, supra note 231, at 3.
235
Chrisman, supra note 1, at 918.
236
The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 9, at 492.
237
Id.
238
See Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud Not on the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of
Classwide Reliance Twenty Years After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 225,
243 (2008).
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sanctions on every secondary actor engaging in deceptive acts. The
SEC noted in its amicus brief filed in the Simpson matter that without
private suits against secondary actors, too many securities violations
would go unpunished because groups of scheming secondary actors
could deliberately plan for one schemer to issue the public misstate240
ment necessary for the successful completion of their fraud.
This
would essentially allow one schemer to risk liability while allowing
241
each of the other participants to avoid it.
The proposed test will
ensure that private litigation properly supplements the efforts of the
SEC to prosecute secondary actors, some of whom might otherwise
elude liability.
IX. CONCLUSION
No one doubts that the scope of liability under § 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 has narrowed significantly in recent years. What was once a law broadly applied to those guilty of
committing deceptive and manipulative acts in connection with the
acquisition or disposition of financial instruments is now tightly circumscribed. Regardless of the approach taken, the crucial matter for
the courts has been the satisfaction of the age old reliance requirement. The reliance requirement remains a legitimate cause for concern. How can one say, absent some misstatement or some duty to
disclose, that an investor buying or selling securities relies on the deceptive conduct of some secondary actor who remains unknown to
that investor?
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court provided some guidance but
did not answer the question fully. In accordance with Rule 10b-5, Justice Kennedy made clear that a material misstatement is not necessary
for a finding of liability. Had he said otherwise, the headlines might
have proclaimed that the Court had dead-bolted the door on liability
242
for secondary actors. Instead, in stating that “conduct itself can be
deceptive,” a position that is in harmony with Rule 10b-5, the Court
239
See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Limits Lawsuits by Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/washington/
16bizcourt.html.
240
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 7, Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2006) (No. 04-55665).
241
Id. at 7.
242
For examples of the news headlines that preceded and proceeded the Stoneridge decision, see John Engler, Washington’s Biggest Decision, WASH. POST, July 2, 2007,
at D-3; Greenhouse, supra note 239; Marc J. Lane, High Court Securities Case a Threat to
Shaky Capital Markets, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Dec. 10, 2007, at 20.

WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

COMMENT

11/8/2010 4:17 PM

1849

assured the continued viability of private suits against secondary actors who commit primary violations of Rule 10b-5 other than making
243
a public misstatement.
The Court, however, did not fully explain
how a plaintiff suing such a secondary actor would be able to show
that he or she is entitled to a presumption of reliance on the secondary actor’s deceptive acts. What the Court did say was that the causal
connection between the plaintiff’s losses and the secondary actor’s
deception was far too attenuated to impute reliance and attach liability. Only when such deception makes a public misstatement by a primary actor “necessary or inevitable” would the reliance requirement
244
be satisfied.
Although it narrowly circumscribes the scope of secondary-actor
liability, Stoneridge does not prevent investors from attaching liability
to secondary actors altogether. The proposed test for presuming reliance in the secondary actor context explains that under circumstances factually distinguishable from Stoneridge, plaintiffs will be able
to demonstrate that there is a close causal connection between the
secondary actor’s deceitful conduct and their losses. Under the proposed test, reliance will be established when (1) the secondary actor
has taken intentional steps calculated to defraud the plaintiffinvestor, and (2) the secondary actor has benefitted materially from
the fraudulent ends he successfully achieved in partnership with the
245
primary actor.
Judicial recognition of this proposed test will prevent the inequity of allowing critical participants in fraudulent
schemes who shrewdly avoid placing their name on some public document to avoid compensating investors for their losses, and it will do
so without trapping innocent parties in costly litigation.

243
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 769
(2008).
244
See id. at 771.
245
See supra Part IV.

